The Internet offers new challenges to the fields of economics and artificial intelligence. This paper addresses several basic problems inspired by the adaptation of economic mechanisms, and auctions in particular, to the Internet. Computational environments such as the Internet offer a high degree of flexibility in auctions' rules. This makes the study of optimal auctions especially interesting in such environments. Although the problem of optimal auctions has received a lot of attention in economics, only partial solutions are supplied in the existing literature. We present least upper bounds (1.u.b) R,, on the revenue obtained by a seller in any auction with n participants. Our bounds imply that if the number of participants is large then the revenue obtained by standard auctions (e.g., English auctions) approach the theoretical bound. Our results heavily rely on the risk-aversion assumption made in the economics literature. We further show that without this assumption, the seller's revenue (for a fixed number of participants) may significantly exceed the upper bound.
Introduction
The Internet exhibits forms of interactions which are not captured by current studies and theories in Economics. The highly distributed nature of the Internet, the relatively easy access to economic trades carried out in remote locations, and the ability of defining various types of Internet trades by individual users, lead to new kind of settings for which new theories should be developed and evaluated.
The Internet is a distributed environment where self-interested parties may interact. The strategic interaction among agents is a major topic of study in Microeconomics (Kreps 1990 ) and Game Theory (Fudenberg & Tirole 1991) . In particular, the design of protocols for strategic interactions is the subject of the field termed mechanism design (Fudenberg & Tirole 1991; Myerson 1991) . Research on strategic aspects of multi-agent activity in Artificial Intelligence has grown rapidly in the recent years.
Work in AI has mostly concentrated on the design of protocols for agents' interaction.
Hence, work in AI shares much in common with work on mechanism design in Economics (Bond & Gasser 1988; Demazeau ~ Muller 1990; Rosenschein ~z Zlotkin 1994; Durfee 1992 ). Many basic principles and ideas grew up from the mechanism design literature.
Much of the research in mechanism design has been devoted to the study of auctions (McAfee & McMillan 1987; Wolfstetter 1996) . There are two reasons for that. One is the popularity of auctions as an economic trade, and the other is the understanding that many of the features studied in the auctions literature shed light on other economic mechanisms (Fudenberg ~ Tirole 1991) . Evidentially, auctions have turned to be a most popular strategic tool in electronic commerce as well, and the number of different auctions carried out in the Internet is huge.
In an auction a good is sold to a single buyer taken from a set of potential buyers (or more generally, several goods are sold to a set of agents), according to some bidding rules and rules for determining the auction's outcome (e.g., the exact price to be paid). There are several auctions that have been found to be representative ones, and which are most widely used in Economic trades. Basic theories regarding these auctions have been developed and few basic results on the seller's revenue in different types of auctions have been obtained (e.g., (Myerson 1982; Milgrom ~ Weber 1982) ). Some preliminaries regarding basic auction theory will be presented in the next section. Given the popularity of auctions in the Internet, and their fundamental role in Economic theories, the adaptation of auction theory to computational settings becomes a task of considerable importance. Naturally, when one considers economic trades in computational settings, he may wish to consider the effects of computational bounds on agents' behavior in auctions. This is the approach taken for example in (Sandhohn 1996) . However, as we show, the computational set-ting also suggests the need for a careful study of basic issues in economics that have (somewhat surprisingly) been neglected.
The Internet is a computational setting, with flexible software which is used by relatively sophisticated users. This makes the study of optimal auctions (e.g., (Myerson 1991; Riley &5 Samuelson 1981; Maskin & Riley 1984) ) highly relevant to this setting. In an optimal auction the seller chooses an auction mechanism that maximizes her revenue in equilibrium. A major claim against optimal (non-standard) auctions is that they are hard to handle, but given the computational environment this task becomes much more reasonable and doable. All that is needed in order to define and manage a new kind of auction is a simple software; typical Internet users will have little problem in participating in such auctions. Indeed, the reader may easily find in the Internet various novel modifications of existing auctions. This leads to the following central questions. What is an upper bound on the revenue one can obtain by an optimal auction, can it be obtained in certain cases, and can it be obtained by classical auctions?
Another basic feature of electronic sales is the lack of commitment power of the seller, and the relatively high-risk for the buyers. This suggests that one may wish to relax the assumption that the buyers are riskaverse (or risk-neutral) agents, that is (always) taken in economics. How does the expected revenue of the seller (from relatively standard auctions) change when we remove the risk-aversion assumption? We show:
1. The expected highest valuation of an object from the point of view of the participants is a least upper bound on the gain a seller can obtain in any auction for risk-averse (and in particular for riskneutral) agents. This result is not obvious given that the bids of agents in equilibria (in relatively standard auctions) may be higher than their actual valuation for the good. This result solves a basic problem in the theory of optimal auctions.
2. If the number of participants is large, then the seller's revenue in an English auction approaches the upper bound.
3. We suggest that the modeling of agents as riskseeking may be appropriate for the Internet setting. We show that in this case a third-price auction enables the seller to obtain a revenue that is higher than the expected highest valuation for the good.
In Section 2 we introduce some preliminaries. In particular, we describe the classical model of auctions.
In Section 3 we present a least upper bound on the revenue obtained by the seller in any auction for riskaverse (or risk-neutral) agents. We also show that this upper bound can be almost matched in English auctions when the number of agents is large enough. In Section 4 we discuss the potential need for modeling agents as having a risk-seeking attitude, and show that in this case a third-price auction can lead to a seller's revenue that is higher than the previously mentioned upper bound.
Preliminaries
Consider a seller who wishes to sell a particular good, where there are n agents denoted by 1, 2,...,n who wish to buy this good. An auction is a procedure in which participants submit messages (typically monetary bids) for the good. 1 The auction's rules specify the type of messages, and as a function of the messages submitted by the participants they determine the winner and the payments to be made by the participants (to the auction organizer). Formally, an auction procedure for n potential participants, N = {1, 2,... (ml,mu,...,m,,) be a vector of messages, then the organizer conducts a lottery to determine the winner, in which the probability that i is the winner equals gi(m). The winner, say j, pays cj(m) and every other participant i pays di(m). It is assumed that M contains the null message e, which is interpreted as non-participation. It is further assumed that if mi = e, then gi(m) = ci(m) = di(m) = O. Classical auction theory associates a (Bayesian) game with each auction procedure and analyses the behavior of the agents under the equilibrium assumption. To do this we have to define the information structure of the game. Let (9i)i~__1 be mutually independent non-negative random variables. When ~i = vi, vi is interpreted as the maximal willingness to pay of Agent i. vi is called the type of i. 2 The distribution of ~)i is denoted by Fi. That is, Fi(v) = Prob (O, < v) . We take Fi to be the uni1These messages can also refer to complete strategies. Hence, the analysis does not refer only to one-shot interactions.
2We use the independent-private-value model of information. There exist more complicated information models in which an agent does not know his own type, and the agents' types are correlated (see MilgTom and Weber (1982) ). We believe that the independence assumption the right one in the Internet auctions setup where there are many anonymous participants.
form distribution on some interval [al, bl] 3. The probability measure induced by Fi on _R+ is denoted by Pi. Let P denote the product probability measure of (Pi)ieN on R~ and let P-i denote the product probability measure defined by (Pj)j¢u\{i} on R N\{i}. Each agent i has a utility function for money ui : R --+ R, normalized with ui(O) = 0. It is assumed that Agent i is an expected utility maximizer. It is further assumed that if Agent i with the type vi receives the item and pays xi, his utility is ui(vi -xi). Agent i is riskaverse if ui is a concave function. A risk-averse agent weakly prefers a certain amount to a lottery whose expected payoff equals this amount. Agent i is riskneutral if ui is linear. Such an agent is indifferent between a lottery and its expected payoff. 4 A strategy for agent i is a function bi : R+ --+ M, where bi(vi) is the message submitted by i when his type is vi. Let b = (bl, b2,..., bn) be an n -tuple of strategies, b is in equilibrium if for every agent i and for every vi, the expected utility of agent i given that his type is vi and given that each agent j, j ~ i uses bj is maximized over mi E M at mi = bi (vi) .
Before expressing the above verbal description with the appropriate formula we remark that this definition makes sense only if certain technical conditions are imposed on all functions under discussion. For simplicity we do not explicitly present these conditions, which are quite common in the economic literature. 5 For a vector of strategies
for v e R~ we denote b(v) = (bl(Vl), b2 (vz),..., b,~(v,~) ) and for agent i we denote b-i(v-i) = Thus, b is in equilibrium if for every agent i and for every type vi, max Ep_ i (ui( vi -ci(TY~i , b- 
Sin the economic literature other distributions are discussed as well. We find uniform distributions quite natural for the Internet setting. Nevertheless, some of our results hold for any distribution. In particular, our proof about the upper bound on the expected revenue can be extended to the case of arbitrary (twice continuously differentable) distributions.
4Notice that a risk-neutral agent is a specific instance of a risk-averse agent. A risk-neutral agent has (up to an increasing linear transformation) a specific utility function (ui(x) = x), while the set of concave utility functions that represent risk-averse agents is huge. In fact, the standard assumption in Economics is that agents/buyers are riskaverse, and the assumption of risk-neutral agents is taken only as an approximation to risk-averse agents, for mathematical convenience.
SThese conditions refer to the structure of the utility and distribution functions. In particular, it is assumed that both are twice continuously differentable.
is attained at mi = bi(vl),
where Ep_ i denotes the expected value operator with respect to P-i.
Under the equilibrium assumption (i.e, the assumption that economic agents use equilibrium strategies), if the auction game G = G(n,A,~, f'), where fi = When the auction game has more than one equilibrium profile, we denote by //Q the revenue of the seller in the worst case, that is the greatest lower bound of the revenues obtained in some equilibrium. We do not consider auction procedures A that are over complicated such that the associated game does not have an equilibrium. Consider a fixed information structure /0, a fixed vector of utility functions fi" with ui = u for all i and u(x) = for al l z, anda fi xed number of p articipants n. Myerson (Myerson 1982) has solved the optimality problem maxA RG and proved that an optimal auction procedure is a second-price auction with an appropriate reservation price. Maskin and Riley (Maskin & Riley 1984) have investigated the optimality problem with a fixed symmetric information structure and a fixed symmetric utility structure in which ui = u for all i, and u is a concave function. Their results indicate, that if an optimal solution exists, it should involve a very sophisticated auction procedure. In the next section we will present a least upper bound P~n(/~) = SUPA, O RG to the seller's revenue, where ranges over all utility structures of risk averse agents, and A ranges over all auction rules. A seller, whose revenue is close to this upper bound does not have to worry about optimality.
Obviously Rn(F) is an upper bound for every fixed utility structure, but it is not a necessarily a least upper bound for a fixed utility structure.
Classical
Auction Mechanisms
In this section we discuss some classical auction mechanisms and show how they can be described in the framework mentioned above.
First Price Auctions One of the most popular auction mechanisms is the first-price auction. In such an auction, each participant submits a bid in a sealed envelop. The agent with the highest bid wins the object and pays his bid, all other participants pay nothing. Ties are broken with some lottery mechanism. In a first-price auction, M = _R+ t0 {e), and for x E R~, gi(x) = 0, ifxi < zo(x) = max{xj : j E N), gi(x) = ~ if xi = w(x) and k(x) denotes the number of agents j for which xj = w(x). Also, ci(x) = xi and d~(x) = 0. 6 In the next section we will use the standard equilibrium analysis of first-price auctions that we now present: We assume that all agents are symmetric (ui = u) and Fi = F for all i, and that F is supported in the interval [0, 1] in the sense that F(0) = F(I) = 1, and F'(x) > 0 for allx E [0,1]. It can be shown that if u is twice continuously differentiable, u'(x) > 0 for all x, and ~,, is increasing, then there exists a unique equilibrium, (bl, b2,..., b,) = (b, b..., where b is the unique solution of the differential equation (see (Riley & Samuelson 1981) ): k-price auctions In a k-price auction each participant submits a bid in a sealed envelop, the winner is the one with the highest bid and he pays the korder statistics of the vector of bids. For example, in a second-price auction if the three highest bids were 10, 9 and 8, then the winner is the one whose bid was 10, and he pays 9. However, if the first three bids were 10,10, 9, then the winner is selected with a probability 0.5 from the two agents with the bid of 10, and he pays 10. It can be easily verified (and it is wellknown) that in a second-price auction, the strategies bi(vi) = vi are in equilibrium for every information and utility structures, k-price auctions, k > 3 have the interesting feature that in equilibrium the agents overbid (see (Wolfstetter 1996) ). That is, bi(v,) vi.
English auctions The English auction is the most popular open auction. In such an auction, there is an initial reservation price (which can be zero) and at each time every player can increase the bid publicly. The auction is over if for a certain (fixed in advanced) time period no one increases the bid. The agent with the last bid wins the object and pays the last bid. Such an auction, like all other open auctions, is analyzed in the framework described above by defining the message space M to be the set of strategies (protocols) the dynamic game induced by the mechanism. Though formally, participants do not actually have to submit a protocol, it is obvious that had they have to do it, they will submit their true protocol, because this protocol is optimal with respect to their beliefs concerning the behavior of the other participants. It is inter-6 If the seller announces a participation fee of c > 0, then
esting to note that English auctions are equivalent to second-price auctions in the sense that for every vector of types, both auctions yield the same winner and the same payoffs to the organizer. In particular, the seller's revenue in both auctions is identical. 7
Dutch Auctions In a Dutch auction, the auctioneer initially calls for a very high price, and then continuously lowers the price until some bidder stops the auction and claims the good for that price. Dutch auctions are strategically equivalent to first-price auctions, and their analysis (and in particular, the expected revenue of the seller) coincide.
3. An Upper Bound on Optimal Auctions In this section we supply an upper bound on the revenue obtained by the seller in any auction for riskaverse agents. We will be able to show that no matter how sophisticated an auction is, although agents may have bids that are higher than their actual evaluation of a good s the seller's revenue can not be higher than the expected highest valuation of the auction's participants for this good. rThis equivalence principle does not hold if we do not assume the independence of types (see (Milgrom 8z Weber 1982) ).
SSee the discussion of k-price auctions in the previous section.
As i can always choose not to participate we conclude that Bi(vi) >_ O. Because ui is concave (i.e., ui(ax + (1 -ay) > (~ui(x) (1 -a )u i(y)), we that ui ( Ep_, ( (vi -ci (bi (vi) (-d,(b,(v,), b_d(1  b_,) )) ___
Because ui is increasing, ui(O) = 0, and u is concave, Jensen inequality (i.e., ui(E(.)) > E(ui(.))) implies that:
Let Ri(vi) be the expected revenue from Agent i given that his type is vi. The last inequality yields Ep(~igi(b) ).
We prove that our bound in an 1.u.b in the case where each Fi is the uniform distribution over [0, 1] . The proof of the general case is similar. Consider a first-price auction, and assume ui = us (0 < a < 1) where uo~(x) = '~ f or e very x > 0. 9 We wil l sho w that when o~ approaches zero the expected gain in this auction approaches the above-mentioned upper bound.
From the equilibrium equation is Section 2 we can deduce that in equilibrium bi = b for all i and
n-I --1 By multiplying both sides of the equality by v we get that: ..... v ,( Y. 9Notice that u~, is not defined for x < 0, and that it can not be extended to a concave function on the whole real fine. Therefore, the complete proof makes use of appropriate modifications of the us's. For simplicity, we omit these modifications in the proof presented here.
The above is equivalent to:
By taking the integral of both sides we get:
(b(.).
Hence, we have:
Therefore, the expected revenue of the seller is
where Vma~ = max(vi)n=l¯ Hence, the seller's revenue approaches our bound when a approaches O. |
Optimality of English Auctions
The above theorem has shown a least upper bound on the expected revenue of the seller in any auction for risk-averse agents. A natural question is whether this least upper bound can be obtained by standard auctions.
In the following theorem we use the fact that the revenue of the seller in English auctions does not depend on the utility functions. We can show: when n approaches infinity (in the sense that the limit of the ratio approaches 1, when n approaches oo). m Hence, the optimal expected revenue can be almost obtained in English auctions, when the number of agents is large enough (which one may expect in Internet auctions). Our results have also an interpretation which is somewhat complementary to the revenue equivalence principle mentioned before. The famous revenue equivalence theorem implies that we can not improve upon the revenue obtained in classical auctions when the agents are risk-neutral. Our results tell us that, at least in what seem to be a setup which is appropriate for many Interact auctions, this is also true when we have arbitrary risk-averse agents.
l°Proof will appear in the full paper.
Risk-Seeking Agents
The number of Internet auctions grow relatively fast, and various modifications for the classical auctions are considered.
However, as we have shown, under the classical assumptions made in Economics one can not go far in optimizing the seller's revenue. In this part of the paper we wish to consider a different kind of setting that may explain some of the phenomena that occur in the Internet setting, and which explore the potential of obtaining a revenue that is higher than the highest participants' valuation.
Indeed, most of the Internet auctions are English auctions, which are known to be strategically equivalent to second-price auctions. There used to be some Dutch auctions (which are strategically equivalent to first-price auctions) but they seem to disappear. On the other hand, a central theorem of auction theory is that the expected revenue obtained by the seller in first-price auctions is greater than her expected revenue in second-price auctions, assuming the agents are risk-averse.
So, how can one explain this situation? One way of explaining the related phenomena is by considering participants that are risk-seeking rather than risk-averse.
Although this assumption does not appear in classical work in Economics, it may make sense in the Internet setting. Indeed, in the Internet setting agents attempt to buy items that they can not really see, and that are sold by an unknown seller, and with no real commitment of the seller.
On the other hand, the buyers need to reveal their credit card information.
Although we do not formally argue for this point, we believe that the modeling of agents as having a risk-seeking attitude rather than risk-aversion attitude should be treated carefully and seriously. In another paper (Monderer & Tennenholtz 1998) we discuss the risk-seeking assumption and show that if the agents are risk-seeking then second-price auctions lead to higher revenue to the seller than first-price auctions. We wish now to re-consider our upper bound on the seller's revenue in view of this different modeling perspective. Technically, the only difference from the previously mentioned setting, is that in the case of riskseeking agents the utility function will be convex rather than concave.
It is well-known that a risk-neutral seller can sell lottery tickets with negative expected gain to a riskseeking agent and obtain as a result very high gains. Our aim here is different. We wish to show that a value that is higher than the upper bound obtained, can be achieved in what can be considered as standard auctions. In particular, we consider the third-price auction, which is another (less studied) instance of k-price auctions.
We will be interested in the following utility function that captures risk-seeking attitude (and is complementary to the one discussed in (Sandholm 1996) with regard to risk-averse agents). We assume that u(x) = when x < 0 and that u(x) = (~x for some constant oc > 1 where x > 0. We can show:
Theorem 3 A third-price auction for risk-seeking agents can lead to an expected revenue which is higher than the expected highest participant's valuation for the good. 11
